Decades of Policy Missteps Led to Biden’s Ukraine Crisis
Expansionist Strategies from the 1990s Set the Stage for Confrontation Between Russia and the West
As President Joe Biden nears the end of a term widely criticized for its handling of international conflicts, the ongoing war in Ukraine stands as a significant point of contention. His departure from office may offer a chance to shift both the trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine war and the three-decade-long policies that contributed to deteriorating relations with Moscow. However, the ability of the next president, Donald Trump, to avoid the same pitfalls remains uncertain.
While Russian President Vladimir Putin ultimately decided to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the foundation for this conflict was laid in the 1990s by American security officials. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia emerged weakened and disoriented. Its leadership, hopeful for integration with the West, found itself increasingly sidelined. The decisions made during this period planted the seeds for future conflict, which escalated during Biden’s presidency.
NATO Expansion and Russia’s Exclusion
The issue was never solely about NATO’s eastward expansion or the European Union’s growth but rather Russia’s exclusion from these processes. As Ukraine pursued Euro-Atlantic integration, Russia was left out, creating tensions between the two historically connected nations. This exclusion contributed to Russia’s securitization and democratic regression under Putin.
An alternative path was once possible through the Partnership for Peace program, introduced by the Clinton administration in 1994. Designed to integrate former Warsaw Pact countries into NATO while keeping Russia engaged, it was ultimately undermined by a select group of American policymakers. Historian Mary Sarotte, in her book Not One Inch, highlights key figures like Daniel Fried, Alexander Vershbow, and Richard Holbrooke, who championed rapid NATO expansion despite objections from Moscow.
John Herbst, another key figure, later compiled a report dismissing verbal assurances made to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev about NATO’s non-expansion. These policymakers, driven by a sense of triumphalism, set a course that disregarded Russia’s security concerns, a stance also reflected in Biden’s own rhetoric as a senator in 1997.
Biden’s Influence on Zelenskyy’s Shift
Upon taking office, Biden found an ally in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Initially elected on a platform of de-escalating tensions with Russia, Zelenskyy had engaged in peace talks with Putin in 2019, leading to a temporary ceasefire in the Donbas region. However, after Biden assumed the presidency, Zelenskyy took a more confrontational approach, targeting pro-Russian elements within Ukraine and advocating for NATO membership, the return of Crimea, and the derailment of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
This shift may have been influenced by Azerbaijan’s military success over Armenia in 2020 and political pressures within Ukraine. In an interview shortly after Biden’s inauguration, Zelenskyy publicly questioned why Ukraine had not yet been admitted to NATO, a stance echoed by his foreign minister in an op-ed for the Atlantic Council, a think tank with close ties to the U.S. government.
The Path to War
Key American policymakers from the 1990s continued to shape U.S. strategy toward Russia under Biden. In March 2021, Fried, Vershbow, and Herbst, among others, issued a report urging the Biden administration to escalate pressure on Russia. Their recommendations, which included fast-tracking Ukraine’s NATO membership and bolstering Black Sea security, contributed to rising tensions.
By April 2021, Putin began deploying troops along Ukraine’s borders, engaging in a months-long standoff. Escalations followed, including the British warship HMS Defender challenging Russian territorial claims, secret U.S. arms shipments to Ukraine, and the announcement of a strategic U.S.-Ukraine partnership. By February 2022, the conflict erupted into full-scale war.
The Fallout and the Future
Despite substantial Western support, Ukraine has suffered immense losses, with millions displaced, economic devastation, and heavy casualties. If peace is achieved, it may resemble the failed Istanbul agreements of 2022, which proposed a neutral Ukraine with military restrictions. Such a resolution, while seen as a Ukrainian defeat, would ultimately benefit its people and contribute to global stability.
The failure of aggressive expansionist policies calls for introspection among Western policymakers. A new approach is needed—one that seeks to mend relations with Russia while ensuring accountability for the war’s atrocities. Ending this conflict is crucial, as its continuation only serves to entrench Putin’s regime and prolong global instability.